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Abstract 
Public procurement in developing countries is associated with a number of problems. Performance-based 
Contracting (PBC) is suggested as a solution for such problems. Here, we investigate whether this suggestion can 
work in the public procurement of developing countries. We use qualitative data from different sources in three 
complementary approaches: secondary data, focus group discussion using the World Café method, and interviews. 
Based on the agency and transaction cost economics theories, the analysis results indicate that using PBC in public 
procurement is believed to minimize some of the most common problems of public procurement in developing 
countries. Specifically, PBC is expected to reduce problems of accountability, corruption, and cost and time 
overrun, and to improve quality.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Traditional procurement systems focus on the lowest price for a fixed result. The important assumption here is that 
competition forces prices down and enables the buyers to get the lowest price (Kleemann, Glas, & Essig, 2012). 
However, price alone does not help to acquire quality results in the procurement process (Qiao & Cummings, 
2003). 
Over the past few decades, performance-based contracting (PBC) became a common practice in the public 
procurement systems of a growing number of countries. PBC has successfully been used specifically for large-
scale projects in different sectors (for example, health, transport, and others) in the industrialized countries 
(Lenferink, Arts, Tillema, Van Valkenburg, & Nijsten, 2012; Martin, 2000). 
In the setting of developed countries, a growing number of studies suggest that using PBC can help to reduce 
the problems associated with the traditional procurement system (Boykin, 2005; Schapper, Veiga Malta, & Gilbert, 
2006; Schiele & McCue, 2006). Similarly, some research suggests this also holds true for developing countries 
(Larbi, 2001). But we see limited application of PBC in the public procurement system of developing countries. 
This research fills that gap and attempts to answer: Why is practice not doing what theory suggests? 
In the context of developing countries, however, there is no clear evidence that PBC can contribute to a well-
functioning procurement system. For one, there is a complete lack of empirical studies on this subject. Second, 
there are some less favorable characteristics of PBC that have to be dealt with too. Also, the existing governance 
structure in the public procurement system of developing countries does not seem capable of addressing the new 
contracting approaches. This is because the legal framework in most developing countries dominantly focuses on 
the principle of competition (more importantly competition on price) and sometimes lacks clarity on how to apply 
PBC, along with a lack of knowledge and skills in developing countries with respect to the PBC concepts (Ambaw 
& Telgen, 2017; Tineo, 2007). We begin to fill this gap by looking at actual practice and assembling empirical 
data on the following points: 
Are the theoretical advantages recognized?  
Are the theoretical risks recognized in practice? How are they appreciated/evaluated? 
Thus, the aim of the study is to verify whether PBC can contribute to solving some problems in the public 
procurement of developing countries, taking Ethiopia as a case.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we analyze the benefits and risks that 
the literature suggests are associated with PBC. Section 3 indicates the methodologies used. In sections 4 and 5, 
we check the potential benefits both for their occurrence and their impact on procurement practitioners in 
developing countries. Finally, section 6 contains the conclusion and remarks on the analysis results. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Agency Theory 
Due to the difficulties of drafting contracts and agreements that state everything in the contract relationship, 
contracts can be considered as incomplete (Davis & Walker, 1997). This, apparently, opens the room for the 
contracting parties to work opportunistically. The likelihood of the contracting parties showing opportunistic 
behavior, as explained by Williamson (1981), is expressed in seeking self-interest with guile and working towards 
fulfilling their own self-interest. The self-interest-seeking agency problem is seen as one of the major problems in 
any set of contractual relationships. Importantly, this makes it necessary to think up and design different 
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approaches to contractual governance to manage the unwanted behaviors of contractors (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 
1992), which is particularly challenging in the public procurement of developing countries. 
Agency theory provides the main theoretical foundation for PBC in the public sector. Opportunistic behavior 
is likely to arise when either one or both of the contracting parties seeks to fulfill their own self-interest but at the 
expense of the other party (Brown & Potoski, 2005). This is commonly due to problems included in information 
asymmetry, adverse selection, and moral hazard (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). Accordingly, the contractual governance 
approach can vary depending on the contract that enables the procuring entity to get information and control the 
behaviors of contractors. Agency theory can, therefore, be used for determining the most efficient contracting 
approach to govern the relationship of contracting parties (Bergen et al., 1992). The choice of the contracting 
approach also depends on the environmental uncertainty and the costs of getting information about the behavior 
of the agent. 
Depending on the contract used, the relationship between the contracting parties can be either behavioral or 
performance-based. The behavioral contracting approach can be used when the buyer is able to control the 
activities and processes of the contractors. In this approach, the principal usually crafts a contract that enables them 
to evaluate and reward the agent on the basis of information about its actual behavior (Bergen et al., 1992). 
However, getting detailed information on the agent’s behavior can sometimes be very costly for the principal. 
Such problems become serious when it comes to the public procurement system of developing countries, where 
public procurement is practiced with lower transparency and less of an accountability system (Musanzikwa, 2013).  
The performance-based contracting (PBC) approach can be used when the clients have difficulty controlling 
the behaviors of contractors through monitoring each and every activity. The principal crafts the contract in such 
a way that the agent’s rewards are determined by performance outcomes (Brown & Potoski, 2005). The contractors 
are presented with an incentive package to perform in the best interests of the buying organization. Thus, using 
PBC can be considered as a solution for public procurement problems resulting from the agency problem (Nilakant 
& Rao, 1994). This contracting approach significantly helps to minimize the accountability challenges of public 
procurement in developing countries (Larbi, 2001).  
1.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Minimizing transaction cost is an important element of public procurement. In this regard, transaction cost 
economics theory takes an even broader perspective: Any problems related to contracting can be examined through 
the lens of transaction cost economics (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). The assumption of bounded rationality is 
deeply ingrained in this theory; it states that human behavior is based on rational intent, but only to a limited extent 
(Williamson, 1998). Human actors are acknowledged to have limited cognitive capabilities. As a result, economic 
actors are not capable of drafting comprehensive contracts that consider all incidents that can occur in the future 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). This results in incomplete contracts that lead us to incur high transaction costs for 
controlling for each of the unforeseen activities that might appear later, i.e. in the contract performance process.  
In addition, it is instructive to see the pairing that exists between bounded rationality and uncertainty/complexity 
(Shelanski & Klein, 1995). Bounded rationality is always there, as “everybody is encumbered by cognitive limits 
rooted in the human physiological makeup” (Williamson, 1998). Thus, to economize on the bounded rationality, 
the contracting parties want to have a reduced level of uncertainty/complexity in the contract. That is where PBC 
comes in, because PBC requires the buyers only to specify the expected performance results, leaving the “how” 
parts to the suppliers as experts. If the purchasers define results/performance in the contract, many of the factors 
that can increase transaction costs do not matter anymore. In line with this, using PBC is expected to reduce the 
transaction cost and enhance efficiency in the contract performance process (Tineo, 2007). This in turn reduces 
the total cost acquisition in the public procurement system (Boykin, 2005). In developing countries, the importance 
of using PBC is greater since the procurement system is characterized by higher transaction cost (Ntayi, 
Namugenyi, & Eyaa, 2010).  
1.2.3 Corruption in public procurement 
The contracting approach used, either behavioral or performance-based, determines the strategies for enhancing 
accountability, controlling corruption, and achieving efficiency and effectiveness in the public procurement system 
(Bergman & Lundberg, 2013; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Corruption in particular is the misuse of public 
resources or public offices for their private benefit, and it is perceived to be more widespread in some countries 
than others (Treisman, 2000). Corruption is a major issue in the public procurement system of developing countries 
(Achua, 2011). Achua (2011) estimated that countries annually lose 20 to 25 percent from their public spending 
through malpractice of public officials. Public procurement in developing countries is identified as one of the most 
corrupted government functions, and Ethiopia is no exception to this statement (Plummer, 2012).  
In line with this, researchers confirmed that a lack of accountability in the public procurement system 
contributes significantly to opening opportunities for corruption (Mahmood, 2010; Mungiu, 2006). Using PBC is 
considered as a solution for this problem since PBC requires clearly defining the responsibilities of each of the 
contracting parties (Doerr, Lewis, & Eaton, 2005) and enhance accountability in the contract performance process 
(Patil & Molenaar, 2011). This helps to minimize opportunistic behavior by the agents and minimize corruption 
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in the public procurement system. 
It is true that the traditional descriptive contracting system used so far in developing countries is considered 
to be a major contributor to the higher corruption rate in public procurement (Musanzikwa, 2013; Worku, 2010). 
Specifically, awarding the lowest responsive bid for procurement of software or other technology related items 
commonly results in products and services that are low in quality, have a high corruption risk, and are not able to 
meet the intended needs of the procuring entities. The lowest price selection method does not result in the best-
qualified contractor or supplier for the need, since the high quality and lowest cost can never go hand in hand 
(Sciancalepore, Falagario, Costantino, & Pietroforte, 2011). In Ethiopia, for example, the procuring entities usually 
use the traditional descriptive specification, and hence the procurement function is characterized by high 
corruption prevalence (Plummer, 2012). They often give more emphasis to price than qualitative aspects for bid 
evaluation and awarding (Worku, 2010). Moreover, the approach does not prevent contractors from engaging in 
corruption activities since the risk of procurement is left to the procuring entity. Rather, it opens loopholes for 
more corruption (Jones, 2007). Achua (2011, p. 6) briefly summarizes corruption in another way with a simple 
mathematical equation form:  
“Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) – (Accountability + Integrity + Transparency) and manifested where 
public officials’ discretion is high and the government’s influence on accountability, integrity, and transparency 
are absent or low.” 
There are various arguments on using PBC in the public procurement system. The first argument is that there 
is less corruption with PBC since the contract result is clearly defined, which leaves less room for manipulating 
the steps towards these results (Straub, 2009). Although there is nothing wrong with using detailed specifications 
for procurement of some goods and services, PBC uses qualitative criteria in addition to price for bid evaluation 
and awarding, and this helps to achieve the intended result (Sultana, Rahman, & Chowdhury, 2012). In addition, 
PBC enables organizations to assign risk and award structures, and hence the contracts and payment modalities 
are aligned clearly with what the procuring entities want to achieve (Buchanan & Klingner, 2007). In this 
contracting approach, contractors are sometimes liable for the later cost (lifecycle cost) (Kim, Cohen, & Netessine, 
2007). This discourages the contractors from engaging in corruption activities in the public procurement process. 
On the other hand, there is also an argument for more corruption with PBC, since PBC allows for more and 
widely varying bids that have to be evaluated by considering both quantitative and qualitative factors (Straub, 
2009). Burguet and Che (2004) support this argument that corruption commonly occurs when the procurement 
entities procure new technologies and/or nonstandard goods and services, which are difficult to evaluate 
objectively. This increases corruption when quality features like after-sales technical service, reliability, safety, 
and impact of the contract would be considered as important for the contract (Qiao & Cummings, 2003). Since 
subjective elements may play a role, this opens the way for corruption. 
Though the low-cost approach has the risk of project failure, due to fear of corruption public procuring entities 
are more reluctant to use the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) approach, which contains a 
combination of a variety of bid evaluation criteria (Fong & Choi, 2000). However, the most economically 
advantageous tender (MEAT) approach is recommended for public procurement provided that there is an objective 
procedure that can prove to the general public that bids are evaluated and awarded using the best possible 
combination of various evaluation criteria (Bergman & Lundberg, 2013; Fong & Choi, 2000; Sciancalepore et al., 
2011). The MEAT approach follows the performance-based contracting approach, which formally uses both 
quantitative (price) and qualitative (non-price) criteria to evaluate and award the tender (Straub, 2009). 
In spite of the different arguments, implementing PBC in the public procurement system is considered as a 
useful tool to minimize the behavior of opportunism by contractors and reduce the risk of corruption (Ambaw & 
Telgen, 2017). This can be of special importance in the public procurement system of developing countries, where 
corruption prevalence is higher. However, the procuring entities need to set objective results and measurement 
systems to be able to minimize the risk of corruption when using PBC. 
1.2.4 Risks associated with using PBC 
In spite of numerous advantages of using PBC, many developing countries still have not been using it for their 
procurement. This may partly be explained by an attempt to minimize some of the risks associated with PBC 
(Gruneberg et al., 2007). 
One of the risks related to PBC emanates from the lack of the required knowledge and ability by the procuring 
entity to define their needs using performance parameters. The public officials who are involved in procurement 
activities should be well trained to be able to craft measurable performance specifications and to evaluate the 
tender accordingly (Patil & Molenaar, 2011). However, acquiring such experts can be a challenge for the 
government entities. In the procurement sector of developing countries, maintaining experienced and qualified 
experts has been a challenge due to the low salary they receive (Musanzikwa, 2013). As a result, developing 
countries might be more reluctant to use PBC in their procurement system.  
The other risk related to using PBC is the reluctance to give a high level of responsibility to the contractors 
(Doerr et al., 2005). When the public buyers are not sure about the measurement models they are using, it may 
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lead them to the wrong performance targets, which could be a source of dispute among the contracting parties 
(Gruneberg et al., 2007). Corruption is also one of the risks that could appear in the performance-based contracting 
system (Burguet & Che, 2004). 
Taking everything into account, this section (the literature review) clarifies our understanding of the concepts 
of PBC and its theoretical relationships, its benefits, and the risks associated with applying it in the public 
procurement system. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
Now that we have identified benefits and risks from literature, the aim of this study is to check them in practice. 
In this study, we consider Ethiopia as a case to study the possibilities PBC offers with regard to the occurrence 
and impact of public procurement problems in developing countries. We do so by three separate research methods 
to triangulate the results. The three methods are: (1) secondary data, (2) focus group discussion using the World 
Café method, and (3) interviews. 
First, we collected a list of existing problems in the public procurement system of Ethiopia (from the Federal 
Public Procurement and Property Administration Agency, and from the Public Procurement Complaint Handling 
Board). The researchers explained the objectives of the research and what type of data we needed to the authorized 
bodies and obtained permission to access the data.  
The Public Procurement Complaint Handling Board (PPCHB) identifies public procurement problems based 
on the complaints received both from suppliers/contractors and procuring entities. Similarly, the Federal Public 
Procurement and Property Administration Agency (FPPAA) identify problems based on the compliance audit 
findings and reports from the PPCHB. The FPPA and the PPCHB gave us the required data, which cover from 
2012 to 2015. After receiving the required data, we selected problems that are more closely related to PBC, and 
we discussed and verified the list of problems with the FPPA officials. 
As a second approach, discussions with public procurement professionals were organized in a World Café 
method. This method helps to involve the public procurement professionals in a focus group discussion and 
identify practical problems and inherent risks of using PBC. It was also used to collect suggested solutions for the 
problems identified. In this regard, the World Café method is considered as the best approach to find detailed 
information, from discussions with procurement professionals in a small round table group (Hornett, 2007; 
Sheridan, Adams-Eaton, Trimble, Renton, & Bertotti, 2010). This method is typically organized as a number of 
small group discussions at different tables between knowledgeable people. Some 18 procurement professionals 
from different organizations were invited for the discussion; 16 of them participated in the round table group 
discussion. The round table discussion was conducted based on four questions. (1) What are the most common 
problems in the public procurement system of Ethiopia? (2) What is the next level of thinking we have to do on 
the problems we mentioned? (3) Could the use of PBC create change in the public procurement problems? (4) 
What risks are expected in using PBC in the public procurement system of Ethiopia? The participants discussed 
in four focus groups and rotated among four tables. Before starting the discussion, each group selected one 
moderator and one recorder. The moderators of each group were given the responsibility of facilitating the group 
discussion, prompting members to speak, and encouraging all the group members to participate freely. 
The discussions took three hours over the four groups at four tables. After they finished the four round table 
discussions, all of the groups got together and the results of the discussions at each table were presented by each 
group’s recorder. Then the researchers asked the participants to comment on the summary of the discussion, which 
is an important part of establishing the validity or congruence of the research project (Krueger, 2006). After getting 
feedback from the participants, we transcribed and developed codes independently of each other, then met and 
shared the findings through email with the participants while developing a list of themes. Working independently 
and collaborating with the participants of the group discussion is an important aspect of developing validity and 
reliability (Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech, & Zoran, 2009). 
As a third approach, interviews were conducted with private organizations (contractors, consultants, and 
suppliers). These interviews were conducted with the managers of 10 private organizations. The agenda of the 
interviews was to identify (from the point of view of suppliers or contractors) the major problems in the public 
procurement system and to ask for suggested solutions for these problems. Each interview on average lasted about 
40 minutes.  
After recording the interviews, we listened to the recordings and transcribed them into text. Then we made 
notes about our most important impressions. For this we re-read the transcripts one by one very carefully. After 
transcribing the data, we labeled the relevant pieces, such as words, phrases, sentences, or sections of the transcripts. 
This process is called coding or indexing. Coding is very relevant because it marks themes that are repeated in 
several places, or perhaps points that surprise us or are stated by the interviewee as important, or points that are 
similar to previously published reports. The researchers took care while coding to be unbiased and stay close to 
the data. We sent the transcripts back to each participant by email for confirmation that the information they 
provided was correctly recorded and transcribed. This step-by-step process enhances the reliability of data in 
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qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003).  
Then, the most relevant codes were chosen and categorized by the researchers either by merging related codes 
together or by dropping some others which were less relevant. We passed through all the codes done in the previous 
step and developed other new codes by merging related codes together and dropping some others. After the coding 
process was finished, the categories were labeled, and we decided which are most relevant and kept those 
categories. Finally, we compiled the results of this whole data management process and started writing the results 
and analysis of the research. 
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Problems of public procurement from secondary data, focus group discussions, and 
interviews 
Though public organizations are striving to achieve efficient public procurement, the qualitative data from Ethiopia 
showed that the sector still harbors a number of problems. The secondary data collected from the Compliance 
Handing Board and the FPPA related to the most common problems of the public procurement system in Ethiopia 
are summarized and described in Table 1-1.  
Table 1-1  Common Problems and their Description 
Problems Description of the problems 
Unable to design clear specification Most public organizations are not able to craft clear specifications for 
their needs. They use a descriptive technical specification that does 
not contain clear information for the suppliers or contractors. 
Poor quality of goods, works, and 
services procured 
The quality of the goods, works, and services procured is very poor 
in almost all public organizations. 
Public procurement risk The risk of public procurement is left to the public organizations 
since most of them use descriptive technical specifications rather than 
performance and functional specifications. 
Lack of accountability  Lack of a clear accountability system in public procurement results 
in high corruption prevalence in the sector. 
High corruption prevalence in the 
sector 
Procurement is identified as a highly corrupt department in the public 
sector. Lack of clear accountability and the use of a descriptive 
specification system are considered to be the causes of higher 
corruption prevalence. 
Higher transaction cost  Public procurement is not managed by professionals in many of the 
public organizations and has become inefficient and ineffective. This 
results in a higher transaction cost. 
Cost and time overrun  Most public projects in Ethiopia are not completed on time; as a 
result, the total cost of projects most of the time is higher compared 
to the beginning contract price. 
As a second approach, the researchers organized focus group discussions with procurement professionals 
using the World Café method. The focus group discussions also identified the most common problems in the public 
procurement sector of Ethiopia, and these results are summarized in Table 1-2.  
Table 1-2  Common Problems Identified by the Focus Group Discussions Using the World Café Method 
Problems Description of the problems 
Lack of proper need identification and 
specification 
 
Public organizations are not properly scrutinizing their needs in 
line with their work plan and are unable to specify their needs with 
performance and functional parameters.  
Low quality of products and services 
acquired 
The public organizations usually acquire inferior quality goods, 
works, and services. 
Competency problem of public 
procurement officials 
The procurement officials working in public organizations are not 
professionally qualified to manage the contemporary needs of the 
public organizations. 
Lack of defined accountability The traditional contracting system used in public organizations 
does not create a clear accountability system between the bidders 
and the procuring entity or between individuals within the public 
organization. 
Time and cost overrun in the contract 
performance process 
In public projects, contract extension and overpayment beyond the 
allocated budget is the common practice. 
As can be seen from Table 1-2, most of the issues raised by the World Café focus group discussions are 
similar to those identified from the secondary data. This confirms the existence of such problems in the 
procurement system. 
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In addition, interviews were conducted with private companies to discuss the most common problems in the 
public procurement system and to suggest solutions for the problems identified. This helps us to triangulate the 
views of the private organizations (contractors, suppliers, and consultants) with those of the public procurement 
officials discussed in the World Café group and the secondary data. Thus, researchers interviewed 10 private 
companies from different sectors (suppliers, contractors, and consultants) which have experience participating in 
government tenders. The results of the interviews are presented in Table 1-3. 
Table 1-3 Common Problems of Public Procurement from the Interviews 
Problems in current public procurement practice # of respondents 
Lack of clear or standard specifications for the needs of public organizations 10 
Lack of a clear accountability system in public organizations 9 
High corruption prevalence in the public procurement system 9 
Delays in payment by the procuring entity 7 
Lack of professionalism among public procurement officers 5 
Centralized procurement system using a long-term framework agreement discriminates 
against smaller companies 
1 
Some of the problems raised in the interview were similar to those in the secondary data and the focus group 
discussions. As indicated in Table 1-3, the public organizations do not have clear or standard specification and 
evaluation criteria that are identified by 100% of the respondents. A lack of clear accountability and a high 
corruption rate are ranked second, identified by 90% of the respondents. Delays in payment by the procuring entity 
and a lack of professionalism by public procurement officials are ranked third and fourth, as identified by 70% 
and 50% of the respondents, respectively. 
1.4.2 Identified problems and possible solutions 
For some of the identified problems, using PBC is suggested as a solution by the focus group discussions using 
the World Café (WC) method, the FPPA, and from the interviews. The public procurement problems and PBC 
contributions are summarized and described as follows in Table 1-4. 
Table 1-4  Summary of Identified Problems and Possible Solutions for Using PBC 
No. Identified problems Possible solutions for using PBC Solutions suggested by 
FPPA 
 
WC 
 
Interview 
1 Unable to design clear 
specification based on 
results 
Enhancing procurement professionals’ 
capability to use PBC. 
√ √ 
 
 
√ 
2 Low quality of products 
and services acquired 
PBC is based on achieving end results; 
using it helps to improve the quality of 
the goods, works, and services procured. 
√ √  
3 Risk of procurement PBC transfers the responsibility and risk 
of procurement from the procuring entity 
to the contractor. 
√ √  
4 High corruption 
prevalence 
Using PBC enhances accountability and 
hence minimizes corruption prevalence. 
√  √ 
5 Lack of defined 
accountability 
Establishing a strong accountability 
system and using PBC minimizes this 
problem. 
√ √ √ 
6 Time and cost overrun in 
the contract performance 
process 
Using PBC allows contractors to flexibly 
use their own systems and methodologies 
during the contract performance process. 
This helps them exert the maximum 
effort to delivering the results and hence 
reduces cost and time overrun in the 
contract performance process. 
√ √  
7 Higher transaction cost Using PBC does not require the 
procuring entity to do frequent 
surveillance and hence helps them to 
reduce transaction cost. 
√  √ 
1.4.3 Risks in using PBC 
Though PBC solves many problems that are found in the traditional public procurement system, using it also has 
some risks. Some of the common risks of using PBC in the public procurement systems of developing countries 
are summarized below. The data from secondary sources, World Café discussions, and interviews shows us: 
• The procurement professionals in developing countries lack the required skills for drafting 
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performance and functional specifications and are unable to evaluate the bid accordingly. 
• Without having a strong check and balance system in the procurement system, using PBC could 
enhance corruption in public procurement since PBC uses more qualitative criteria for bid evaluation. 
• The contractors may not be willing to accept the contract in PBC – If the incentive packages provided 
for them are not sufficient for the contractor to compensate for the level of risk taken, contractors may 
not be willing to take the contract. 
 
1.5 Discussion of the Results 
Our research demonstrates the challenges of public procurement in the traditional procurement system. The results 
of the data from different sources (secondary data, focus group discussions, and interviews) depicted in section 
four show consistencies with each other greater consistency and are discussed here in detail.  
Problems in specification writing 
Both in the World Café discussion and in the interview, it become clear that in Ethiopia, specifications are often 
copied either from earlier tenders or from the Internet (by IT workers) and are sometimes tailored to meet a certain 
specific brand. In other instances, suppliers who have special relations with public officials are involved in drafting 
the specifications. This is typically a potential red flag for what may be illegal collusion in the procurement process. 
The consequence of this is that the procuring entity misses out on the benefits of the competitive procurement 
process (competition in quality and price) and hence incurs a higher cost for the goods and services delivered. 
 The traditional approach to public procurement in Ethiopia uses descriptive and detailed specifications for 
goods, works and services. The aim is to assure quality and achieve the least price with a competitive tender. 
However, using price alone as a major selection criterion does not ensure gaining quality results for the 
procurement process. This is, importantly, consistent with other studies as suggested by Waara and Bröchner 
(2006). The descriptive specifications are drawn up using the available knowledge and experience of the procuring 
entities, possibly, sometimes with the help of the internal IT personnel. Using PBC is considered to be a solution 
for these and related problems in the public procurement system since procuring entities do not have to describe 
the detailed technical specification, instead simply specifying the expected results to be achieved.  
Lack of clear accountability in the procurement system 
The Ethiopian public sector, like any other developing country, has accountability problems. The data for this 
research indicates that due to a lack of clear accountability, contractors have not been accountable for problems 
that occur in the contract performance process. Usually, the procuring entities think that the procurement process 
is conducted smoothly, and they blame suppliers for supplying inferior quality goods, works, and services. 
However, the data suggests that the root causes of such problems, most of the time, are the lack of clear need 
identification and specification that would make it possible to define the responsibilities of the contracting parties. 
For example, in Ethiopia, in works contracts, the maintenance work starts one year after completion of the 
buildings and roads and the handover of the project to the procuring entity. Such maintenance might sometimes 
cost more than the original construction cost. This is because the traditional, descriptive specification system used 
so far does not make the contractor liable for such problems (Gruneberg et al., 2007; Patil & Molenaar, 2011). 
Rather, due to the agency problem found in the contracting system, the contractors are motivated to work towards 
satisfying their own self-interest by reducing the quality instead of delivering the required results for the intended 
purpose. 
In Ethiopia, a formal institutional setup that helps to enhance accountability and integrity in the government 
system has been established. Some of the important institutions established, especially at the federal level, are 
Auditor General; Public Procurement Complaint Handling Board; Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission; Public 
Procurement and Property Administration Agency; and ethics officers in each of the procuring entities. However, 
the result of this study’s analysis shows that the actual corruption practice in the public procurement system is still 
high. This is because the traditional contracting system used so far does not clearly define the responsibilities of 
each of the contracting parties (Ntayi, Namugenyi, & Eyaa, 2010).  
PBC in the public procurement system, however, solves accountability problems in the contract performance 
process of public procurement (Buchanan & Klingner, 2007). In line with the literature (Sultana et al., 2012), the 
data analysis indicates that PBC is considered as an important contracting system, which shows how responsibility 
and accountability has shifted over time from giving more emphasis to inputs and processes (design specifications) 
to focusing on outputs, quality, and outcomes (performance-based specifications). The approach defines who is 
accountable for what and gives little room to the contractor to deviate from the expected outcomes of the contract 
(Lenferink et al., 2012). This minimizes the agency problem that can appear in the contract performance process 
(Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 1992). As compared to the traditional approach, PBC holds contractors accountable for 
providing a specific service, which can be measured in terms of “quality, outputs and outcomes” (Martin, 2000).  
Accountability in the PBC system means that the contractor is accountable for both the output and outcome of the 
contract delivery process (Bergman & Lundberg, 2013). Typically, the contractors are held responsible for fitness 
for purpose and for financial accountability for their contract performance, and this helps to decrease corruption 
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prevalence. This can also help to decrease time, transaction cost, and waste of resources in the contract 
administration process (Straub, 2009b). Furthermore, PBC in the public procurement of developing countries can 
bring a great change by enhancing accountability, which is a common problem in the system. To achieve this, 
however, issues such as transparency, client satisfaction, fair play (equality), and integrity are also required to be 
maintained together with accountability. 
Corruption practice in public procurement 
Public procurement is one of the key policy implementation instruments in public organizations. However, public 
organizations, which mobilize a large amount of the country’s resources, are regarded as particularly vulnerable 
to corruption. Despite the efforts made by the government of Ethiopia, the data analysis results indicate that 
corruption prevalence is a serious problem in public procurement. The number of anticorruption strategies that 
have been attempted – like establishing an ethics and anticorruption agency, an ombudsman, legal protections for 
whistle-blowers, and an expenditure and procurement reform program, have been unsuccessful in Ethiopia 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission & JGAM Donors, 2013).  
For these and other related problems, applying PBC in public procurement is considered as one of the key 
solutions. In line with the agency theory proposed by Nilakant and Rao (1994), the approach fixes the loopholes 
that are found in the traditional contracting system. It transfers the risk of procurement towards the contractor 
(Gruneberg et al., 2007; Tineo, 2007). In spite of the different arguments, the data indicates that using PBC in the 
public procurement system enhances accountability and transfers much of the risk of procurement, such as fitness 
for purpose and operational performance, towards the contractor or supplier. This can enhance accountability and 
reduce the practice of corruption in the public procurement system (Ambaw & Telgen, 2017).  
In addition, PBC is based on assessing the performance and functional values of the bid, instead of the 
activities and process of the contract performance (Buchanan & Klingner, 2007). This typically encourages the 
bidder to work towards achieving the end results and hence hinders the contractors from engaging in corruption 
practices. The approach also integrates incentive and penalty packages, which have a positive influence on the 
behaviors of contractors in the contract performance process. This encourages the contractors to work towards 
achieving performance end results rather than getting involved in corruption activities with public officials. Thus, 
PBC in the public procurement of developing countries can be considered as an important tool to decrease the 
prevalent corruption practice by solving the agency problems that occur between the contracting parties. 
Cost and time overrun in public procurement 
In the traditional descriptive contracting system, experience and existing literature show that public organizations 
have some difficulties in managing quality, time, and cost effectively (Straub, 2009a). The problems become more 
serious when they manage more complicated projects. 
Similarly, this research confirmed that there are often delays in project completion or delivery as compared 
to the schedule and this is one of the most common problems due to various reasons. Some of the root causes for 
delays in project performance are a slow contract administration process by the procuring entity (delayed decision-
making, delayed payment, etc.), lack of proper need identification, and a lack of proper supervision of contract 
performance by the procuring entity. This inefficient traditional procurement system in the public sector 
contributes a lot to the cost and time overrun of public projects. 
A typical example of the traditional contracting system is seen in one of the Road Upgrading Project contracts 
in Ethiopia. This is the actual practice raised by the focus group discussion. In this contract performance, the 
consultant elapsed 99.78% of the total contract time while the contractor’s actual achievement was only 39.63% 
of the planned 99.92%. Finally, the contractor got a time extension approved. However, the gap between the 
remaining percentage of work and time was very large within the added time. This unnecessary delay obviously 
had an impact on the project cost. This required the procuring entity to pay more than the contract price for the 
consultant for the added time and for the contractor due to price escalation. In addition, the project was not 
completed on time for the purpose needed. 
Furthermore, in Ethiopia, for works contracts the traditional design-bid-build (DBB) process follows two 
steps, separating the planning and the design phases of contracting process. Through this process, contractors are 
selected using the low bid approach. But this method does not give any satisfactory result because the approach 
does not consider results, but rather pays for the activities and processes. In line with the TCE theory, using PBC 
in public procurement is considered as a solution to reduce the transaction cost resulting from bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and risk neutrality (Ambaw & Telgen, 2017). Accordingly, the analysis results confirmed that the 
implementation of PBC in the public procurement of developing countries can help in reducing cost and time 
overrun, which is a major challenge in the system. 
Quality of goods, services, and works procured 
The study indicates that the traditional descriptive contracting system, which focuses on the lowest price selection 
method, is used widely in Ethiopia (Ambaw & Telgen, 2017). This does not help the procuring entities to select 
qualified contractors based on their qualifications or based on their proven ability to perform similar projects (Qiao 
& Cummings, 2003b). Sometimes, this traditional method of contracting includes some prequalification criteria 
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for improving the quality of contracting results. However, when the contractors are selected based on their 
competitive price, there is always the risk that the contractors will compromise on quality to reduce cost. Indeed, 
the probability of selecting non-qualified contractors is higher. This results in acquiring inferior quality goods, 
works, and services (Sciancalepore et al., 2011). It is the actual practice in Ethiopia that newly constructed 
buildings and roads are not properly serving the intended purpose. In addition, in many public organizations, newly 
bought goods are stored for long periods or not used for the intended purpose and then disposed of after a while.  
On the other hand, the literature recognizes that if the contract is properly designed considering performance 
end results, PBC results in a reduced cost for a contract while increasing the quality of products or services (Sultana, 
Rahman, & Chowdhury, 2013). This is because PBC considers qualitative criteria for the selection of contractors. 
It also allows the procuring entity to acquire goods and services that fulfill the functional and performance 
requirements. The study participants recognize that PBC improves government procurement by plugging the leaks 
found in the traditional procurement system. It also helps them to achieve the best value for public money. More 
specifically, application of PBC in the public procurement of developing countries can be considered as a powerful 
instrument for minimizing the quality problems practiced in the system that arise due to the agency problem.  
Risks of using PBC 
One of the risks associated with PBC arises from a lack of the necessary knowledge to define the needs using 
performance parameters. The analysis results reveal that public organizations and contractors in Ethiopia have 
practiced for several decades using descriptive specifications. As a result, the organizations may not have the 
capability to craft performance specifications and evaluate the bids accordingly. In addition, due to poor 
performance specifications that do not clearly define the results, the contractors usually do not understand the 
expected results of the contract. Thus, they are not willing to accept the risk of poor performance of the contract. 
This results in few bidders taking part in the PBC bid, which in turn has the effect of reducing the potential benefit 
of competition. For this type of contract, contractors usually need better incentives to compensate for the risks they 
take (Patil & Molenaar, 2011). 
Another risk of using PBC is using qualitative criteria for bid evaluation, which is more prone to judgmental 
decisions. Naturally, PBC is a contracting system that considers various characteristics of the bid for evaluation 
besides the price (Boykin, 2005). PBC considers qualitative aspects, which most of the time are susceptible to 
subjective judgmental decisions. Thus, these seem to be more open to fraud and corruption. The analysis results 
revealed that due to the subjectivity of the bid evaluation, there is a fear by the procuring entities that using PBC 
might increase the corruption prevalence, which is already high. 
Furthermore, procurement professionals believe PBC transfers the risk of procurement towards the contractor. 
Due to a fear of such risk, contractors sometimes may be reluctant to take contracts in the PBC system. This results 
in few contractors involved in the public tender. This in turn becomes a favorable condition for a few risk-taking 
contractors to establish a monopolistic/oligopolistic system in the market. This in turn creates an opportunity for 
them to manipulate the price and smuggle public resources.  
 
1.6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Public procurement is an important instrument for the governments in developing countries to achieve their 
objectives through acquiring the required goods and services. However, in actual practice, public procurement in 
developing countries is surrounded by a number of problems that can hinder it from achieving its objectives and 
value for public money. 
To this end, the main objective of this research is to analyze how using PBC in the public procurement system 
could solve some of the public procurement problems in developing countries. For this, we used qualitative data 
from different sources (secondary sources, focus group discussions, and interviews). The data analysis result 
revealed that using PBC can minimize some of the most common problems of public procurement in developing 
countries, i.e. enhance accountability and minimize corruption, increase quality of procurement, increase 
efficiency, and reduce the transaction cost. 
Therefore, this study offers two important contributions (from academic and practical perspectives). From 
the academic perspective, the study widens the theoretical research related to PBC in a transaction cost economics 
approach proposed by Brown and Potoski (2003), and in terms of the agency theory and uncertainty, as proposed 
by Nilakant and Rao (1994).  
From a practical perspective, the study results provide two important suggestions to avoid the root causes of 
public procurement problems in developing countries. It suggests the need for using PBC in the public procurement 
system of developing countries. The other important suggestion from a practical perspective is that of enhancing 
the capacity and capability of the procurement staff. Here, strengthening the knowledge and understanding of the 
procurement officials who are working in the procurement process is significantly important. Creating a clear 
understanding of why it is important to use PBC in their procurement process has also a greater contribution to 
minimizing such problems. In line with this, the leadership commitment to allocating the necessary resources and 
their willingness to professionalize the procurement system can also play a major role in this regard. 
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